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Abstract: We use the China General  Social  Survey (2005) and the Home Office Citizenship 
Survey (2005) to study civic engagement and neighbourhood trust in China and Britain in this 
paper. We focus on class differences in participation in sports/recreation, religion, children's/adult 
education and public-welfare activities, and trust in the neighbours. We find higher levels of civic 
involvement in Britain but greater neighbourhood trust in China. This is mainly due to structural 
differences.  China  has  a  large  proportion  of  peasants  who  have  very  low  levels  of  civic 
involvement but very high levels of neighbourhood trust. Among the non-peasant population, the 
two countries have similar levels of class differences in civic (except religious) involvement. There 
are small class differences in China on neighbourhood trust, but marked effects in Britain. Overall, 
there is a greater similarity than difference in class effects in both civic engagement and social 
trust  in  the  two countries.  While  differences  in  demographic  attributes  (and  China's  specific 
institutional arrangement, the household registration system, or hukou) account for some of the 
observed patterns, we also find more pronounced class than demographic effects in the two 
countries. Class plays a major role in the development of social capital.
Keywords: Britain; China; civic engagement; class; hukou; neighbourhood trust
1. Introduction
Much research has been conducted on civic engage-
ment and social trust, particularly in Britain and the 
USA. Yet, little is known about civic life and trust in 
China or how it is compared with that in developed 
countries such as Britain. This paper seeks to make a 
contribution to this respect. The two countries have 
different  histories,  socio-economic  structures  and 
political institutions impacting upon the two domains 
of  social  life.  Britain  has  a  long  civic  history  but 
China's civic life is in its infancy. Even less known are 
the  structural  forces  shaping  civic  engagement  and 
social trust in the two countries. From a sociological 
perspective, we may expect both similarities and dif-
ferences  impinging  upon  the  development  of  social 
capital. The similarity may be the common class de-
terminant and the difference may be due to China's 
lack of civic tradition, its lower level of socio-economic 
development and its unique institutional arrangement
© 2013 by the author; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published under 
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(the  household  registration  system,  or  hukou in 
Chinese)  that  can  be  expected  to  affect  not  only 
people's  life  chances such as  social  and geographic 
mobility but also life choices in civic involvement and 
social  trust.  Yet  given  the  rapid  economic  develop-
ment, the growing socio-economic disparity and the 
burgeoning civic  life  in China in the last  three dec-
ades, a comparative study of the state and the drivers 
of social capital may be feasible, as is attempted in 
this paper.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we give a brief review of the literature on social 
capital, paying particular attention to the civic tradi-
tion of the research paradigm. We also discuss some 
socio-political  differences  in  the  two  countries  that 
might have a strong bearing on the development of 
social  capital.  After that we give an account of  the 
data and methods to be used for this research, fol-
lowed by the presentation of results. The paper will 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of the 
findings.
2. Debate on Social Capital
There has been much debate on social capital in the 
last  two  decades.  Scholars  have  argued  about  the 
nature and origin of social capital [1], the rise and fall 
of voluntary life in capitalist countries, particularly in 
the  USA  and  Britain  [2-5],  the  causes  and  con-
sequences of voluntary involvement [6-8] and so on. 
Research  on  formal  civic  engagement  in  developing 
countries such as China is,  however,  limited although 
considerable research has been conducted on the instru-
mental aspects of informal social connections [9,10].
Yet, in spite of the debate, a consensus is readily 
found about the nature of social capital in the writings 
not  only  by  the  well-known  scholars  in  the  area 
[2,9,11,12]  but  also  by  those  following a particular 
strand  of  the  research  paradigm.  Briefly,  most  re-
searchers in the area agree that social capital pertains 
to social resources residing in social connections. The 
disagreements are mainly on the manifestations and 
consequences associated with different kinds of social 
connection. Thus one finds striking similarities in the 
definitions of social capital: as 'the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to pos-
session of a durable network of more or less institu-
tionalised  relationships  of  mutual  acquaintance  and 
recognition' ([11], p. 51); as 'resources embedded in 
one's network or associations' ([9], p. 56); as aspects 
of a social structure that facilitate 'certain actions of 
individuals  who  are  within  the  structure'  ([12],  p. 
302);  and as 'connections among individuals—social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustwor-
thiness that arise from them' ([2], p. 19). It is fairly 
clear that Bourdieu, Coleman and Lin emphasize the 
stratification/instrumental  functions of social  connec-
tions whilst Putnam places greater importance to the 
expressive/civic values of formal  and informal  social 
involvement. We confine the following discussion on 
the civic tradition of this research paradigm.
In the civic tradition of social capital research, Put-
nam's work is the most influential. His notion of social 
capital  is  comprehensive and yet imprecise: compre-
hensive because it covers most of the research agenda 
in this  area,  and imprecise because it  contains both 
causes  (connection)  and  consequences  (trustworthi-
ness) in the same definition which has led to much 
controversy. He also views both connection and trust as 
consisting of different layers. With regard to connec-
tion, there are formal and informal social involvements. 
The former refers to membership and activity in civic 
organizations which are related neither with the state 
nor with employers (although some employers do have 
civic programmes in operation). This kind of civic activ-
ity has the function of community building and the par-
ticipants in the voluntary activities are called 'machers' 
who are 'all-around good citizens' ([2], p. 94). In com-
munities rife with volunteers, not only the machers but 
onlookers,  passers-by and other members all  benefit 
from the social cohesion, solidarity and generalized re-
ciprocity that are engendered in the process. The cost 
of  conducting socio-economic activity  is  reduced and 
the quality of life is enhanced. The latter, informal in-
volvement, refers to the good-will and various acts of 
spontaneous and generous giving of time, effort and 
money to neighbours, friends, colleagues and others, 
fostering the flow of soul, or 'schmoozing' as Putnam 
calls it. Both formal and informal social networks facilit-
ate the development of bonding and bridging ties, with 
the former referring to in-group solidarity and the latter 
to out-group linkage, which increase social interaction 
(although too much bonding might have a 'dark side' 
as Putnam also acknowledges), enhance mutual under-
standing, and strengthen community cohesion.
While there is general consensus about social capit-
al inhering in social connections, there is less agree-
ment about trust. We noticed that Putnam uses the 
term 'trustworthiness' rather than 'trust' as a defining 
characteristic  of  social  capital,  and  warns  of  using 
'trust'  uncritically as an indicator. Unwarranted trust, 
he says, might simply mean 'gullibility' ([13], p. 668). 
Yet  while  his  definition  points  to  ego-based  trust 
(one's own trustworthiness), his analysis is based on 
alter  trust,  that  is,  trust  in  fellow citizens  ([2],  pp. 
139–141),  a practice widely followed by most other 
researchers. The slippage is consequential for survey-
based research. Trustworthiness refers, as he says, to 
the readiness to act in pursuance of the obligation of 
reciprocity but it is hard to validate this from survey 
responses.  A  person  may  be  highly  trustworthy  in 
dealing with friends,  colleagues and neighbours but 
acts  cautiously  or  even  unethically  in  dealing  with 
strangers,  or  s/he  may  be  utterly  untrustworthy  in 
personal behaviour but still proffers a trustful view in 
the response. One cannot therefore infer about a per-
son's trustworthiness from survey responses. Yet, at a 
more general  level,  it  may be fairly  safely assumed 
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that if a large proportion of people in a region or a 
country report that most people can be trusted, we 
can be quite confident about the general social atmo-
sphere of that area in contrast to the situation in an-
other place  where most people regard one another 
with suspicion.  Thus whilst  an individual's  credibility 
cannot be judged solely on the basis of his/her re-
sponse to the survey item on generalised trust, ag-
gregate responses in this regard do speak about the 
social character of a society.
More refined distinctions can be made with regard 
to  alter  trust:  trust  at  the  macro,  meso  and  micro 
levels [14]. The first is the afore-mentioned trust in 
one's fellow citizens, which Putnam calls 'thin' trust to 
differentiate it from 'thick' trust in people with whom 
one deals in daily encounters, particularly among fam-
ily and friends (micro-level trust). Putnam holds that 
thin  trust  'rests  implicitly  on  some  background  of 
shared social networks and expectations of reciprocity' 
and thick trust is 'embedded in personal relations that 
are strong, frequent, and nested in wider networks' 
([2], p. 136). For decades, social and political scient-
ists have relied on the survey question: 'Do you think 
that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be 
too careful?'  Note here that the response modes to 
this question are set as mutually exclusive,  but the 
question actually taps both attitudinal and behavioural 
aspects of trust. Being careful in dealing with strangers 
does  not  necessarily  prevent  one  from  forming  a 
generally favourable judgement about the overall social 
milieu in which one finds oneself, while trusting fellow 
citizens does not presume carelessness in one's own 
behaviour [15]. Furthermore, neither response to this 
question says much about one's own trustworthiness 
as earlier noted. Thus, trust in fellow citizens, being 
careful in one's own activities and being trustworthy 
are different dimensions. On the other hand, a case 
could be, and indeed is often, made that information 
on generalised trust is valuable in aggregate analysis. 
A society with higher levels of generalised trust is usu-
ally one with better governance [16], less corruption 
and lower crime [17], higher economic growth [18] 
and better personal and public health [19]. Such asso-
ciations  are  becoming  more  firmly  established  from 
findings  based  on  large-scale  datasets  such  as  the 
European Social Survey or the World Value Survey.
An  ongoing  debate  on  the  relationship  between 
civic engagement and trust is concerned with which of 
the two has the causal priority. Putnam, following Toc-
queville, holds that civic engagement is the 'school of 
democracy'  where  people  learn  from  shared  civic 
activities how to work together, solve collective prob-
lems,  form  a  closer  and  more  dynamic  community 
and,  in  the  process,  become  more  trusting:  'those 
more engaged in community life are both more trust-
ing and more trustworthy' ([2], p. 137). Yet it could 
also be the case that it is not civic activity that fosters 
trust but it is those who are innately trustful who are 
more likely to participate in civic activities in the first 
place.  While  analyses  based  on  contemporaneous 
data cannot make causal inferences about trust from 
participatory activities, research using panel data can 
shed some light. For instance, using the British House-
hold Panel Survey, Li,  Pickles and Savage [20] show 
that, controlling for prior levels of trust, civic engage-
ment does not make people more trusting. Similar find-
ings are shown in Switzerland [21] and France [22], 
but not in Japan [23] which has fewer civic associations 
than other developed countries ([24], p. 501).
If  civic  engagement does not  necessarily  lead to 
greater trust, the question is turned to other possible 
sources. According to Uslaner [25], generalised trust 
is  moralistic in nature, a value passed over genera-
tions  and  learned through  early  childhood.  If  one's 
grandparents or parents are more trusting, people will 
grow up with the world view that 'most people can be 
trusted'. This view also tallies with Putnam's observa-
tion that thin trust reflects one's life experience and 
with the survey findings that those from higher class 
origins,  particularly  the  second-generation  middle 
class,  tend  to  display  greater  levels  of  generalised 
trust,  in  contrast chiefly  with the second-generation 
working class ([26], p. 405; [27]). This may reflect 
the greater confidence of the most privileged groups 
in society in dealing with people in different situations, 
reinforced  by  their  command  of  greater  socio-eco-
nomic-cultural resources and their safer working and 
living conditions protecting them from the harsh real-
ities  faced  by  the  disadvantaged  groups  who  may 
place greater trust in their bonding ties.
With regard to 'thick' trust at the micro level, that 
is, trust in one's family and friends, research shows 
that it has shrunk just as thin trust has much dissip-
ated ([2],  pp.  140–141).  Pahl  and Pevalin  [28] and 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears [29] show that 
people in the USA and in Britain have 'hunkered' in 
their  social  relations,  with  smaller  circles  of  friends 
who are increasingly drawn from kin rather than from 
friends,  colleagues  or  neighbours.  The  evidence  on 
both strands of trust lends support to the thesis of de-
clining social capital in the two countries. 
Between thin and thick trusts, one may think of a 
meso-level  trust,  that  is,  trust  in  people  in  one's 
neighbourhood. Indeed, while thin trust in the gener-
alized others (fellow citizens) may seem too nebulous 
to ordinary people and thick trust in family and friends 
could be generally taken as a given, the meso-level 
trust  is  regarded  by  some  researchers  as  a  better 
measure of community cohesion [30]. Most people's 
daily encounters are limited and they may have little 
knowledge  about  the  trustworthiness  of  most,  let 
alone all, of their fellow citizens, and their working life 
may be rife with competition. Trust in the neighbour-
hood could avoid these issues and it might also be 
seen  as  an  indicator  of  one's  own  trustworthiness. 
People  who trust  most  of  their  neighbours  tend  to 
have good relations with them through honest beha-
viour,  generous  help  and  frequent  exchange  of  fa-
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vours, and are in turn accepted as being trustworthy 
by their neighbours. Untrustworthy people are unlikely 
to make friends or maintain good relations with neigh-
bours.  This  kind of  trust  does not  depend on one's 
socio-economic position  as much as the macro level 
trust does. Given these and other considerations, one 
may argue, as do Heath and Laurence [30], that the 
meso-level  trust  is  a  better  instrument  than  thin  or 
thick trust for measuring social cohesion. In this paper, 
we adopt this approach and use neighbourhood trust 
together with civic engagement as the core elements of 
social capital in the two countries ([31], see [32-34]).
Having discussed civic engagement and social trust 
at  some  length,  we  now have  a  brief  look  at  the 
socio-cultural underpinnings of social capital. Sociolo-
gists  researching  on  social  capital  usually  look  at 
socio-economic differences in its generation. Here the 
general  consensus  is  that  formal  civic  engagement 
and generalised trust are conditional upon the socio-
economic resources at one's disposal. Take research 
on British social capital as an example. Although Hall 
[3] and Li, Savage and Pickles [4] disagree about the 
trends of social capital in the country, with the former 
claiming a vibrant and healthy civic life and the latter 
claiming a general decline, they do agree about the 
pronounced and increasing social division underlying 
the changes. As class-based research on China's civic 
engagement and social trust is limited, we know of no 
such analysis of Chinese civic life or trust (although 
see brief discussions in [35,36]).
A  comparative  study  of  civic  life  in  Britain  and 
China has considerable challenges. The two countries 
have  many  differences  in  terms  of  civic  traditions, 
political  institutions and levels of economic develop-
ment.  Britain  has  a  democratic  polity  and  a  liberal 
economic system with a long tradition of civic engage-
ment  spanning  over  one  hundred  years  [3,37]. 
Successive governments in Britain have adopted 'civic-
friendly' policies. The current government is trying to 
build a 'Big Society' in order to 'mend the broken Bri-
tain' [38]. China's situation is rather different. With a 
state socialist polity and a dual economic structure (a 
growing market sector accounting for around 80% of 
the GDP but a strong state sector holding monopoly 
powers in key economic areas), civic engagement in 
China has  rarely  been officially  endorsed or  encour-
aged. Even in present-day China, the state grip on the 
voluntary sector is still firm, although much more re-
laxed than in the first three decades after the founding 
of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Furthermore, 
as Fei [39] observed long ago, China does not have a 
tradition of civic engagement, and Chinese social life is 
clan-based  with  a  clearly-defined radius  of  trust  ex-
tending, like a ripple, from family, kin, friends, neigh-
bours, fellow-villagers/townspersons, fellow workers, to 
others.
A  second difference  relates  to  the  shape  of  the 
class  structure.  Formal  civic  engagement is,  as  ob-
served in previous research [3,4,37], closely related to 
the state of economic and political life. Britain has a 
large middle class which has helped offset the civic-
eroding  forces  of  the  market.  The  decline  in  civic 
culture could, among other things, be traced to the 
marked changes in the occupational structure with the 
contraction of the working class and its involvement in 
trade  unions  and  working-men's  clubs.  Middle-class 
civic  participation  tends  to  be  spontaneous  and 
individualistic.  In  the  early  1970s  when  the  British 
economy was in buoyancy, the working class enjoyed 
a  healthy  and  vibrant  civic  life.  Yet,  with  the  state 
retrenchment, the collapse of heavy industry and the 
privatization  of  economic  activity,  the  working-class 
collective  strengths  via  trade  unions  have  all  but 
disappeared [40].
It is not possible to trace such trends in China, due 
to the lack of data. However, the rapid economic de-
velopment in the last thirty years and the loosening of 
the ideological control by the state would lead us to 
expect a burgeoning civic life, especially in the urban 
areas  where  people  may  spontaneously  organize 
themselves  to  solve  problems  engendered  by  the 
withdrawal  of  public  services,  the gnawing pains  of 
economic transition, and the institutionally-backed in-
equality. For instance, during the economic restructur-
ing,  millions  of  urban  workers,  especially  women, 
were laid off, many even in their thirties or forties. In 
search of a relatively meaningful and constructive life 
in the face of economic transition, growing competi-
tion and increasing inequality, many people would set 
up  recreational,  educational  or  mutual-help  groups. 
Similarly, over 200 million peasants have moved into 
cities to find a job and better life for themselves and 
their children. How to spend their spare time and help 
with  children's  education  is  of  chief  importance  to 
them.
We would also expect a growing civic life in China 
as a result of overall rising prosperity. From 1980 to 
2005,  the  average  real  annual  income in  China  in-
creased at a  rate 6.4 times as  high as that  of  the 
world  average  ([41],  p.  1489).  Between  1970  and 
2010,  China's  HDI  (Human  Development  Indicator, 
developed by  the  United Nations  Development Pro-
gramme [42]) rose from 0.349 to 0.718, ranking the 
country 75th place out of 135 countries with compar-
able data, above the regional average. Yet, with the 
rising  prosperity  comes  increasing  social  inequality, 
with the Gini coefficient jumping from 0.35 in 1980 to 
0.45 in recent years (some even estimated it to be 
over 0.5), much higher than the 0.37 in the UK ([42], 
p. 26). In 2005, the per capita income in Shanghai 
(the  richest  place  in  China)  was  7.6  times  that  in 
Guizhou (the poorest province in China). Boasting one 
of the most rapidly developing economies in the world, 
China is now finding itself with increasing unease and 
embarrassment (the overwhelming goal of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Socialist system is to provide 
equality for the Chinese people, which is enshrined in 
the country's Constitution) as one of the most unequal 
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and  increasingly  polarised  societies.  Within  China, 
people of all walks of life and government at all levels 
are aware of the growing social inequality, and build-
ing a 'harmonious society' has become a state policy, 
with even the top leadership now calling for a 'sci-
entific social management' [43] including a bigger role 
for the voluntary sector. More people with more money 
would  also  mean a  more  active  civic  milieu  with  a 
sizeable  number  among  the  growing  middle  and 
upper  classes  making  contributions  to  voluntary, 
including fund-raising, activities to help the poor, fight 
against  natural  disasters,  and  enhance  the  public 
welfare in general.
Sociological analysis of social capital in China could 
hardly proceed without taking into account the most 
significant political institution, namely, the household 
registration system (hukou). This system, instituted in 
1955 to regulate population migration, job assignment 
and resource allocation, has placed the rural and the 
urban  sectors  into  the  greatest  social  divide.  A 
person's hukou status is determined at birth, following 
that  of  the  mother.  Most  people  in  the  countryside 
thus  have  rural  hukou,  and  are  destined  to  be 
peasants except for the few who could escape such a 
fate, usually via higher education or joining the army 
and  becoming  an  officer.  Although  the  system has 
been gradually loosened in recent years, particularly 
in small cities, access to urban hukou in big, particu-
larly metropolitan, cities still remains an insurmount-
able barrier for most people born in the countryside. 
This system, absent in Britain, is not only an obstacle 
for social mobility, but also a hindrance for civic en-
gagement: the two are closely linked. The institution-
ally-enforced lack of upward mobility chances, coupled 
with  a  clan-based  and  inward-looking  tradition  and 
culture, may produce an abundance of bonding ties 
but stifles formal voluntary activities.
There are many other differences between the two 
countries which cannot be covered here due to space 
limit. Yet one other difference has to be mentioned as 
it has a direct influence upon social capital generation. 
China is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
with around 80 million members. As the predominant 
political  force in  the country  with exclusive powers, 
the  CCP  members  have  more  socio-economic  re-
sources than the population at large and are also ex-
pected to be 'vanguards' in political life and to serve 
as role models in socio-economic life. As civic engage-
ment cannot be separated from the socio-political life 
in  a  country  like  China,  any  study of  social  capital 
would be incomplete without taking into account the 
role  played  by  the  CCP  membership,  just  as  with 
hukou. We shall therefore take both as China-specific 
factors in addition to the common socio-demographic 
factors in the analysis.
There are surely many other differences between 
the two countries which we do not have space to cov-
er here. Even the factors outlined above—differences 
in civic tradition, socio-economic development and the 
unique combination of the CCP rule and the household 
registration (hukou) system in China, which is not only 
absent in Britain and other developed countries,  but 
also in other countries of the developing world—would 
make  the  comparative  study  being  undertaken  here 
approximate  to  a  'most  different  systems'  analysis 
which would lead us to expect pronounced differences 
in social capital in the two countries. Yet, from a soci-
ological perspective, we may also expect some similar-
ities,  namely, that people in more advantaged social 
(class) positions in both countries would be more likely 
to  find  themselves  in  formal  civic  activities  (and  to 
benefit therefrom), and that there would not be much 
cross-country  difference with regard to  class  effects. 
The  questions  we  wish  to  address  are  therefore  as 
follows: What are the shapes of civic engagement and 
neighbourhood trust in China and Britain? What are the 
common  and  the  unique  factors  that  explain  the 
differences in the two respects? How big are the class 
differences relative to demographic/institutional ones?
3. Data and Methods
To address the questions outlined above, we use, in 
this  study,  the  China  General  Social  Survey  (CGSS, 
2005,  hereafter  called  'China')  [44]  and  the  Home 
Office Citizenship Survey for England and Wales (HOCS, 
2005, hereafter called 'Britain' for ease of presentation 
although  there  is  no  intention  that  the  findings  will 
necessarily be applicable to Scotland) [45]. Both are 
large-scale national representative surveys. The CGSS 
is jointly conducted by the Survey Research Centre of 
the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 
and the Sociology Department of the People's Univer-
sity of China. The first CGSS survey was launched in 
2003,  followed  annually  or  biannually.  The  CGSS 
covers 28 provinces, autonomous regions, and muni-
cipalities  in  mainland  China  with  the  exception  of 
Qinghai, Tibet and Ningxia. The CGSS2005 has 10,372 
respondents aged 18 years and over and resident in 
private households at time of interview. The HOCS is 
also a time-series data source conducted annually or 
biannually  beginning  in  2001.  The  HOCS2005  has 
14,081 respondents aged 16 or over and resident in 
private households at time of survey. In the present 
paper, we confine the analysis to respondents aged 18 
to 70, resulting in a slightly reduced sample size for 
both  surveys.  Both  datasets  have  cross-sectional 
weights  (as  provided by  the data collectors)  to  ac-
count for selection biases, which are used in all ana-
lyses reported in the paper so that our findings can be 
generalized to the respective populations.
The most important reason for using the datasets 
is the availability of comparable questions on civic en-
gagement  and  neighbourhood  trust.  In  both  data 
sources, the respondents are asked (CGSS2005 E18; 
CS2005 Fgroup) whether they partake in civic activit-
ies which are not sponsored by the state or organized 
by their employing organizations. Four common types 
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of civic activity are selected for use in the analysis: 
sports/recreation, religion, children's/adult education, 
and public welfare (poverty relief, social justice, dis-
aster aid and environment protection). The respond-
ents are also asked (CGSS2005 E14b; CS2005 Strust) 
how many  people  in  their  neighbourhood could  be 
trusted: many, some, a few, or none. As very few of 
the  respondents  say  that  they  trust  none  of  their 
neighbours (1.4% in China and 1.6% in Britain), we 
have grouped the last two categories. These form our 
outcomes of interest (dependent variables) [46].
Both  datasets  have  rich  details  on  socio-demo-
graphic attributes. With regard to our main interest in 
the  stratification  factor,  class,  we  use  a  modified 
Goldthorpe  [47]  class  schema,  differentiating  the 
higher and the lower salariat (professionals, adminis-
trators  and  managers),  routine  non-manual,  own-
account, manual workers in industry and commerce, 
peasants  [48] (for  China) and never worked.  Other 
variables included in the multivariate analysis are age, 
age squared, gender and marital status and, as men-
tioned above, China-specific factors on hukou and CCP 
membership [49]. As the central aim of the paper is to 
assess the class effects on the two domains of social 
capital  in  the  two countries,  it  is  essential  that  we 
assess whether class has stronger or weaker effects in 
Britain or China in each of the domains under discus-
sion, and whether class effects are stronger or weaker 
than demographic/institutional ones in each country. 
For this purpose, we use the Wald test method [50].
4. Analysis
We now proceed with analysis. We start by looking at 
the sample characteristics and the overall profiles of 
civic engagement and neighbourhood trust in the two 
countries, and then move on to (gross and net) class 
effects on the two domains.
The data in Table 1 show that the two samples are 
basically similar in terms of age and gender distribu-
tions. Marital status is, however, much different, with 
around 87% of the Chinese sample but only 58% of 
the British sample being married [51]. In this regard, 
the Chinese people might be viewed as being much 
more 'traditional' than the British. Another salient dif-
ference concerns the distributions to class. As a devel-
oping country, China does not have as big a middle class 
as Britain. Only 10% of the Chinese are found in the 
salariat class, as compared with 35% in Britain. This is 
mainly due to a very large proportion of the Chinese 
(41%) being peasants [52]. In terms of China-specific 
characteristics discussed earlier, we find 51% with rural 
hukou status and nearly 10% being CCP members.
Table 2 shows the overall  profile of civic engage-
ment and neighbourhood trust in the two countries. 
We list the proportions in each type of civic involve-
ment in the upper, and those at each level of neigh-
bourhood trust  in  the  lower,  panels.  We  also show 
whether the  differences  in  the  distributions  in  each 
category  between the  two countries  are  statistically 
significant, using China as the reference.
Table 1. Sample characteristics (percentages or means/standard deviations).
China Britain
Sex
Female 53.2 50.4
Male 46.8 49.6
Marital status
Non-married 13.2 42.4
Married 86.8 57.6
Class
Higher salariat 4.8 10.8
Lower salariat 5.4 20.1
Routine non-manual 13.9 12.1
Own account 5.2 8.7
Manual worker 23.9 38.5
Peasants 40.9 -
Never worked 6.0 5.8
Hukou origin
Urban 48.6 -
Rural 51.4 -
CCP member 9.6 -
Age (mean) 42.8 42.6
Age (SD) (13.0) (14.5)
(N) 9,817 12,04
Notes: 1. The urban/rural distinction and CCP membership status refer to China 
only; 2. For respondents resident in private households aged 18–70 at the time of 
interview; 3. Weighted analysis in this and all  following tables.  Sources:  China 
General Social Survey (2005) [44] and Citizenship Survey (2005) [45].
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Table 2. Proportions in  civic  engagement and 
neighbourhood trust in China and Britain.
China Britain
Participation in civic 
organisations
Sports/recreation 26 47***
Religion 6 17***
Education 24 32**  
Public welfare 23 33***
Trust in neighbours
Many 61 47***
Some 29 36***
None/a few 10 16***
Note: Results of significance test for the differ-
ence in each category are shown with China as 
the reference category, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 
and ***p < 0.001.
From  the  data  in  Table  2,  we  can  see  that  the 
Chinese people are much less involved in civic activity 
but have much higher trust in their neighbours. In each 
of  the  four  types  of  civic  engagement,  the  Chinese 
sample has a significantly  lower proportion than the 
British: around one half in sports/recreational and reli-
gious activities and two thirds in activities for children's/
adult  education  and  for  public  welfare  as  compared 
with  Britain.  Yet  a  much  higher  proportion  of  the 
Chinese  sample  regards  their  neighbours  as  trust-
worthy: 61% of the Chinese as compared with 47% of 
the British say that many of their neighbours can be 
trusted [53].
The overall differences in the two domains are not 
hard to understand. China, as noted earlier, does not 
have a tradition of civic involvement. The Chinese cul-
ture encourages people to look up to the authorities 
for  organizing socio-economic life  and solving prob-
lems of social injustice. Yet, underlying these overall 
differences,  there  may  be  more  powerful  structural 
(class) differences. In the following analysis we try to 
disentangle such differences.
Table  3  shows  the  class  differences  in  the  four 
types of civic engagement. Apart from religion where 
the  Chinese  people  are  known to  have a  generally 
lower affiliation than the British, the distributions to 
the other aspects are as expected. Three notable fea-
tures emerge from the table. First, the peasant class 
have a very low level of involvement in formal recre-
ational, educational and public/welfare activities, much 
below  any  other  group.  Secondly,  apart  from  this 
exceedingly  low  involvement  as  induced  by  the 
institutionally-enforced  barrier,  we  also  find  marked 
class differences among the non-peasant sections in 
China, which amount to a similar extent to that found 
in Britain.  Thus  the differences between the higher 
salariat and the manual working class in sports/recre-
ation in China run at 23 percentage points  (57% – 
34%), comparable to the 24 point difference in the 
British sample in this regard (61% – 37%). The differ-
ences between the two classes are 19 and 14 points 
respectively in education,  and 24 and 20 points re-
spectively in  public welfare.  Thirdly,  while there are 
fairly small class differences in religious involvement in 
China, such differences are still salient in Britain, with 
one in four of the higher salariat partaking in religious 
activities, twice as much as the manual working class.
Table  4  shows  the  data  on neighbourhood trust. 
Here we find that those in the most disadvantaged 
positions in China, the peasants, are the most trustful 
group,  with  71% saying  that  many  people  in  their 
neighbourhood (village) can be trusted and only 6% 
believing that only a few or no one in their neighbour-
hood can be trusted.  This  is  the  most  trustful  class 
among all the Chinese social groups. Among the other 
classes in China, there is little difference in trust, with 
most groups having at least 50% believing that many 
of their neighbours can be trusted. The British profile is 
rather different, with those in more advantaged class 
positions being more trusting. Thus we find that 59% 
of the higher salariat but only 40% of the working class 
say that many of their neighbours can be trusted, with 
a difference of 19 percentage points in this regard.
While the data in Tables 3 and 4 show similar class 
effects in civic engagement between the two countries 
and greater class differentials in neighbourhood trust 
in Britain than in China, one might wonder whether 
such patterns are spurious. We noticed earlier that a 
much higher proportion of respondents in the Chinese 
sample were married and much research has shown 
that marriage is itself a form of social capital in multi-
faceted aspects [2,7,20]. So, perhaps the class differ-
ences as we have just observed are confounded and 
would reduce to insignificance once the demographic 
attributes such as age, gender and marital status as 
well as China-specific factors (hukou and CCP mem-
bership) are controlled for.
Table 3. Class differences in civic engagement in China and Britain.
Sports/recreation Religion Education Welfare
China Britain China Britain China Britain China Britain
Higher salariat 57 61 4 25 50 39 53 45
Lower salariat 56 57 6 23 48 41 48 45
Routine non-manual 43 51 8 19 39 36 36 35
Own account 20 46 8 18 27 31 23 29
Manual worker 34 37 6 12 31 25 29 25
Peasants 6 - 4 - 9 - 7 -
Never worked 42 32 10 16 30 26 25 20
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Table 4. Class differences in neighbourhood trust in China and Britain.
China Britain
Many Some Few Many Some Few
Higher salariat 58 31 12 59 34 7
Lower salariat 54 34 12 57 32 11
Routine non-manual 50 37 13 48 39 13
Own account 60 30 10 49 32 19
Manual worker 54 33 13 40 38 22
Peasants 71 23 6 - - -
Never worked 54 30 16 31 44 25
To  address  this  question,  we  conduct  multivariate 
analysis.  Table  5  shows logit  regression  coefficients 
where participation in each type of civic activity, and 
trusting  'many'  neighbours  [54]  are  our  outcome 
variables. Apart from within-country analysis, between-
country comparisons are also made with China as the 
reference.
Looking  at  the  demographic  attributes,  we  find 
that,  controlling for  all  other factors  in  the models, 
Chinese men are significantly less likely to be involved 
in religious but  more involved in children's  or  adult 
educational activities than Chinese women. The first 
finding may indicate greater time constraint and the 
second  a  conventional  perception  and  associated 
sense of  responsibility  [55] that men should take a 
greater  role  in  educational  matters,  especially  chil-
dren's education by, for instance, actively partaking in 
PTA  matters.  Except  for  greater  participation  in 
sports/recreation, British men are less likely to attend 
religious, educational and welfare activities than Brit-
ish women. With regard to cross-country comparison, 
we find, with the exception of sports/recreation which 
may indicate a relative lack of facilities in China, that 
British men play a smaller role than Chinese men in 
both education and public welfare activities. It is inter-
esting to note that whilst no significant gender differ-
ence  manifests  itself  with  regard  to  neighbourhood 
trust in China, British men are found as being signific-
antly more trusting than British women, attesting to 
previous research on US and UK societies with regard 
to  generalized and particularized trust  ([3],  p.  432; 
[7], p. 71; [20], p. 118; [26], p. 405; [27], p. 35; al-
though  [7]  p.  74  find  notably  but  non-significantly 
higher male than female trust in neighbours). In Bri-
tain, marriage seems to have a more salient impact 
on civic activity than is found in China, which is unsur-
prising as an overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
sample are married. Nevertheless, in both countries, 
the married tend to have more congenial neighbourly 
relations as indicated by higher levels of neighbour-
hood trust. Other things being equal, age effects are 
generally slight in both countries.
The class effects manifest themselves most system-
atically and saliently. Controlling for all other variables 
in  the models,  we find the  Chinese  peasants  being 
least likely to be engaged in civic activities, which is a 
clear indication of their lack of resources and opportun-
ities. To this, we also need to add the significant in-
activeness for people with rural hukou origins: people 
with the rural hukou origin status and currently found 
as peasants are doubly handicapped and their likeli-
hood  to  engage  in  sports,  education  and  welfare 
activities  is  very  much  behind  that  of  their  higher 
salariat compatriots (e(–1.71 + –1.33) = 0.048, e(–1.60 + –0.94) 
= 0.079, and e(–1.73 + –0.88) = 0.074 in the odds). People 
in non-salariat positions, particularly manual workers, 
are also found to be significantly behind their higher 
salariat counterparts in  sports, education and welfare 
activities,  and  that  in  both  countries.  CCP members 
have, other things being equal, a generally more active 
profile in sports/recreation, education and public/welfare 
activities as well as in trust, which is most probably due 
to  their  greater  command  of  socio-economic-cultural 
resources  [56].  In  Britain,  the  class  gradients  are 
salient and systematic,  including those in neighbour-
hood trust, with the manual workers being only around 
one third to one half as likely as the higher salariat to 
engage in civic activities or to trust their neighbours 
(ranging from e–0.99 = 0.37 to e–0.69 = 0.50 in the odds).
Having looked at the data in some detail, we come 
to  an overall  look.  Here we are interested in  three 
questions as outlined earlier: (1) are there significant 
cross-country class differences for people in the same 
class positions? (2) in which of the two countries do 
we find greater class differences at the overall level? 
and (3) do class differences manifest themselves at a 
higher  or  lower  level  than  demographic/institutional 
ones within each country?
As for the first question, our data in Table 5 clearly 
show that,  apart  from religion  and trust  where  the 
Chinese people do not show much difference as earli-
er noted, there are few significant cross-country class 
differences. Only in 3 out of 12 tests (bold figures in 
the class part) do we find significant differences, and 
two of them are related to the self-employed: namely, 
that the own-account workers in China are even less 
likely  than  their  British  counterpart  to  engage  in 
sports/recreational  activities,  or  children's/adult  edu-
cational clubs. This suggests that people in the same 
class positions in the two countries behave in a fairly 
similar  way in  terms of  civic  engagement.  In  other 
words, the relative advantages and disadvantages as-
sociated with  class  manifest  themselves  in  basically 
the same manner in the two countries.
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Table 5. Logit regression coefficients on civic engagem
ent and trust in neighbours ('trusting m
any') in China and Britain.
Civic engagem
ent
Neighbourhood trust
Sports/recreation
Religion
Children/adult 
education
Public w
elfare
China
Britain
China
Britain
China
Britain
China
Britain
China
Britain
M
ale (fem
ale = ref)
0.05
0.27***
–0.55***
–0.52***
0.14**
–0.59***
0.08
–0.46***
0.04
0.20***
Age
–0.10***
–0.03**
0.04
–0.03*
0.03*
0.04***
–0.02
0.02*
0.01
0.02
Age squared
0.00***
0.00
–0.00
0.00*
–0.00***
–0.00***
–0.00
–0.00
–0.00
0.00
M
arried
–0.35***
0.04
–0.19
0.52***
0.00
0.54***
–0.14
0.06
0.23**
0.23***
Class (Higher salariat =
 ref)
Low
er salariat
–0.04
–0.10
0.45
–0.22**
–0.15
0.02
–0.17
–0.11
–0.10
–0.02
Routine non-m
anual
–0.47***
–0.33***
0.62*
–0.52***
–0.57***
–0.34***
–0.59***
–0.59***
–0.24*
–0.29***
Ow
n account
–1.24***
–0.56***
0.68*
–0.39***
–0.99***
–0.30***
–1.00***
–0.76***
0.04
–0.47***
M
anual w
orker
–0.66***
–0.98***
0.50
–0.98***
–0.78***
–0.69***
–0.75***
–0.99***
–0.13
–0.69***
Peasants
–1.71***
–0.33
–1.60***
–1.73***
0.22
Never w
orked
–0.69***
–1.28***
0.78**
–0.66***
–0.96***
–0.73***
–1.12***
–1.20***
0.01
–0.83***
Rural hukou (urban =
 ref)
–1.33***
0.12
–0.94***
–0.88***
0.49***
CCP m
em
ber (other =
 ref)
0.51***
–0.29
0.43***
0.70***
0.17*
Constant
2.95***
1.17***
–3.70***
–0.53*
0.34
–0.78***
0.83**
–0.64**
–0.32
–0.88***
N
9,624
11,781
9,624
11,781
9,624
11,781
9,624
11,781
9,534
11,77
Notes: 1. For w
ithin-country differences in each dom
ain, each category is contrasted w
ith the reference category. *p <
 0.05, **p <
 0.01, ***p <
 0.001; 2. For 
betw
een-country com
parisons, significant differences in either direction are show
n in bold under the colum
n of Britain (all bold figures significant at the 0.05 level 
or higher).
With regard to the second question, further analys-
is shows that there are no cross-country class differ-
ences  at  the  overall  level  in  terms  of  sports/recre-
ational activities, children's/adult education and public 
welfare activities (p 0.817, 0.053, 0.993) but there are 
significantly greater class impacts in religion and trust 
in Britain than in China (at the 0.001 level) in both 
cases.  This  suggests  that  apart  from religion,  class 
operates in the same way in both countries in terms 
of civic engagement.
Finally in this section, further analysis with respect 
to the third question shows that class effects are sig-
nificantly  more  pronounced  than  demographic  (and 
including, in China,  hukou and CCP membership) ef-
fects in each of the civic types and in neighbourhood 
trust, and that in both countries (all significant at the 
0.05 level or above), attesting to the key role played 
by class in social capital development.
5. Conclusions
This analysis has focused on two domains of  social 
capital  in  China  and  Britain:  civic  engagement  and 
neighbourhood trust. Drawing on national represent-
ative surveys in the two countries containing similar 
questions on the two domains,  our evidence shows 
stronger  civic  engagement  in  Britain  but  greater 
neighbourhood trust in China at the overall level. Yet 
underlying this are strong structural (class and, addi-
tionally in China,  hukou) effects. In this section, we 
give some reflections on the findings. 
With regard to the lower civic engagement in China 
than in Britain, there are of course many reasons. We 
have  noted  Fei's  [39]  famous  discussion  of  China's 
tradition of clan-based social life under the centralised 
power  system  which,  while  fostering  trust  among 
family, friends, kin and neighbours, stifles civic spirit 
under  which  people  spontaneously  organize  them-
selves to solve community problems, as was the case 
in the USA [2,57], and China also lacks the tradition of 
strong state support for civic associations as found in 
Britain [3,37]. The strict control  by the Government 
since 1949 in almost every aspect of socio-economic 
life has also resulted in a rather unfavourable socio-
political milieu for civic organizations to take root in 
China.  It  was  during the  reform period  that  NGOs, 
GONGOs (government-organized non-government or-
ganisations),  or  community  groups  such  as  literary 
groups,  elderly  groups,  friendship  groups,  fellow-
student associations, sports/recreational clubs, religious 
and sundry hobby groups began to emerge and devel-
op, which grew rapidly in the last one or two decades 
from 107,304 in 1991 to 386,917 in 2007 [58]. But civic 
organizations in general are finding themselves being 
sandwiched: they are being closely monitored by the 
Government and watched over by ordinary people with 
caution and even some suspicion [59].
The lower level of socio-economic development in 
China may also help to explain its lower civic engage-
ment. As observed by many researchers [2-4,7,20,26,
30,33,34], the middle class has been the backbone of 
a  vibrant  civic  life  in  the  developed  countries.  As 
China's middle class is much smaller than that in Bri-
tain and as China has a very large peasant population, 
it  may take decades for China to catch up. Yet our 
findings of a fairly similar role played by class in the 
two countries in civic engagement give the hope that 
as China's economy continues to grow and as its urb-
anisation programme strives forward, its civic life will 
begin to prosper too.
Our  findings  of  the  strong  class  effects  on  civic 
engagement also show the mounting challenges faced 
by  the  governments  in  the  two  countries  in  their 
attempts to build 'harmonious' or 'big' societies. Those 
in more privileged positions in  China,  just  like their 
British counterparts, are more active in civic life whilst 
the manual working classes in both countries, particu-
larly the peasants in China, face considerable short-
ages  in  socio-economic  resources  preventing  them 
from taking an active part in civic activities. Although 
civic involvement has externalities, the main benefi-
ciaries are the participants whose networks generate 
direct or indirect resources for themselves and their 
family.  Privilege breeds privilege and many kinds of 
civic activity are arenas for developing bridging social 
ties  serving  both  civic  and  instrumental  purposes 
[2,9,10].
Our  analysis  showed  some  apparently  unusual 
features on religion and neighbourhood trust. As for 
religious engagement, the kind typically  practised in 
rural  China is folk religion such as ancestral tablets, 
memorial  halls  or  Buddhist  temples. In some urban 
and rural settings, Christianity has grown fairly rapidly 
in  recent  years,  boasting  more  Christians  in  China 
than  in  Britain.  Church  activities  are,  however,  not 
officially endorsed, may be shunned by the elites and 
are watched with suspicion by the authorities. Overall, 
formal  religious  activity  is  not  a  common  practice. 
Religious involvement in Britain is much more formally 
organized where middle-class attendance is more pre-
valent than in China although a decline in both believ-
ing an belonging is also found in process [26,60]. The 
difference  on  trust  is  most  probably  due  to  the 
different  mobility  chances  in  the  two  countries.  In 
Britain,  owing to the high (absolute) rates of  social 
mobility [61] and its attendant geographical mobility, 
the overall social homogeneity at the local level would 
be lower than that in China [62]. On the other hand, 
the presence of a long-existing housing market would 
mean that class clustering at the neighbourhood level 
would be higher than that in China. The greater social 
mixing  may  explain  the  class  similarity  in  trust  in 
China whilst the greater class clustering may explain 
the greater class differences in trust in Britain. Social 
mobility is a double-edged sword: it promotes econom-
ic development but disrupts social relations. As China's 
modernisation programme is bound to generate unpre-
cedented  levels  of  social  and  geographical  mobility, 
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how to maintain  community  cohesion is  a  challenge 
faced by the government and ordinary citizens.
Research  on  civic  engagement  and  social  trust 
tends to give the impression that the engaged and the 
trustful  are heroes of a civil  society. They are, in a 
certain sense. But their very ability to engage in civic 
life and to place trust in their fellow citizens resides in 
their greater command of socio-economic resources. 
The most disadvantaged, be they peasants or manual 
workers, are deprived of opportunities to engage in 
organized civic activities. It is these groups in whom 
the real hope of civic dynamics and social trust should 
be  placed,  for  without  their  active  engagement,  no 
'harmonious' or 'Big' society could be built. For that to 
happen, the rising socio-economic inequality must be 
curbed.
Finally,  much  research  in  the  developed  and  the 
former socialist countries has shown the explanatory 
power of class in social  mobility [47,61] and educa-
tional attainment [63]. In this paper, we have shown 
similar class effects between Britain and China, and 
that in the social capital  domain. The two countries 
possess as much difference as can be found almost in 
any other two countries in the world in terms of civic 
tradition,  socio-economic  development  and  political 
institutions. The similar class effects not only attest to 
the construct validity of class as a sociological concept 
but also the challenges faced by the governments in 
reducing the class inequalities.
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